Evaluation of animal biosafety webinar series for professionals working in animal facilities across Pakistan during the COVID-19 pandemic

Experimental research with animals can help the prevention, cure, and alleviation of human ailments. Animal research facilities are critical for scientific advancement, but they can also pose a higher risk than other biomedical laboratories. Zoonosis, allergic reactions, bites, cuts, and scratches by animals are all substantial concerns that can occur in animal facilities. Furthermore, human error and unexpected animal behavior pose a risk not just to humans, but also to the environment and the animals themselves. The majority of biosafety and biosecurity training programs focus on clinical and biomedical laboratories dealing with human safety factors, with little emphasis on animal biosafety. The current virtual training was designed to improve biosafety and biosecurity capabilities of animal laboratory personnel, researchers, and veterinarians from different regions of Pakistan. The results revealed that understanding was improved regarding triggers for risk assessment in addition to annual and regular reviews (56% to 69%), biosecurity (21% to 50%), decontamination (17% to 35%), safe handling of sharps (21% to 35%), Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) (17% to 40%), Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) usage by waste handlers (60.9% to 75%), waste management (56% to 85%), animal biosafety levels (40.57% to 45%), and good microbiological practices and procedures (17% to 35%). To bring human and animal laboratories up to the same level in terms of biosafety and biosecurity, it is critical to focus on areas that have been overlooked in the past. Training programs focusing on animal biosafety should be conducted more frequently to strengthen bio risk management systems in animal research facilities.Copyright © 2021

Vaping Behavior in Young Adults During the COVID-19 Pandemic.

BACKGROUND: Electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS) continue to be popular among young adults. These devices are often advertised as a healthy alternative to quitting tobacco cigarettes. However, young adults represent a population who view it as a novel behavior that provides a sense of popularity, social acceptance, and desired physiologic properties. The objective of this study was to examine characteristics of vaping behavior among college students and explore possible associations between groups of vaping behavior (stopped, initiated, increased, decreased, stayed the same). METHODS: In a multi-center cross-sectional study, 656 students from University of Tampa in the United States and University of Applied Sciences in Germany (IST) were recruited to answer a 31-item online questionnaire. A chi-square test was used to evaluate associations between the groups. RESULTS: Prevalence rates indicated approximately 31% of all students were currently using ENDS. Even though more negative than positive experiences with ENDS were reported, most students stated their vaping increased during COVID-19 lockdowns. Addiction and stress relief emerged to be predictors (P < .001) of an increase in vaping, whereas social motives were not statistically significant. Living situation (P = .63) and depression (P = .10) were not significantly associated with vaping behavior. CONCLUSIONS: ENDS products continue to yield very high levels of nicotine creating addiction in young adults. Addiction counseling and evidenced-based practices should be employed at every level (individual, community, and school). Additionally, mental health counseling for students in pandemic and high-stress environments may help to combat stress in a more proactive manner than self-medicating.

Gain-of-function research.

The term Gain-of-Function (GoF) describes the gain of new functions by organisms through genetic changes, which can naturally occur or by experimental genetic modifications. Gain-of-Function research on viruses is enhancing transmissibility, virus replication, virulence, host range, immune evasion or drug and vaccine resistance to get insights into the viral mechanisms, to create and analyze animal models, to accelerate drug and vaccine development and to improve pandemic preparedness. A subset is the GoF research of concern (GOFROC) on enhanced potentially pandemic pathogens (ePPPs) that could be harmful for humans. A related issue is the military use of research as dual-use research of concern (DURC). Influenza and coronaviruses are main research targets, because they cause pandemics by airborne infections. Two studies on avian influenza viruses initiated a global debate and a temporary GoF pause in the United States which ended with a new regulatory framework in 2017. In the European Union and China, GoF and DURC are mainly covered by the legislation for laboratory safety and genetically modified organisms. After the coronavirus outbreaks, the GoF research made significant advances, including analyses of modified MERS-like and SARS-like viruses and the creation of synthetic SARS-CoV-2 viruses as a platform to generate mutations. The GoF research on viruses will still play an important role in future, but the need to clarify the differences and overlaps between GoF research, GOFROC and DURC and the need for specialized oversight authorities are still debated.

The Promise of Emergent Nanobiotechnologies for In Vivo Applications and Implications for Safety and Security.

Nanotechnology, the multidisciplinary field based on the exploitation of the unique physicochemical properties of nanoparticles (NPs) and nanoscale materials, has opened a new realm of possibilities for biological research and biomedical applications. The development and deployment of mRNA-NP vaccines for COVID-19, for example, may revolutionize vaccines and therapeutics. However, regulatory and ethical frameworks that protect the health and safety of the global community and environment are lagging, particularly for nanotechnology geared toward biological applications (ie, bionanotechnology). In this article, while not comprehensive, we attempt to illustrate the breadth and promise of bionanotechnology developments, and how they may present future safety and security challenges. Specifically, we address current advancements to streamline the development of engineered NPs for in vivo applications and provide discussion on nano-bio interactions, NP in vivo delivery, nanoenhancement of human performance, nanomedicine, and the impacts of NPs on human health and the environment.

Research at risk: Global challenges, international perspectives, and Canadian solutions

Although traditionally viewed as paragons of international cooperation, research institutions and universities are becoming venues for hostile foreign activity. Research security (RS) refers to the measures that protect the inputs, processes, and products that are part of scientific research, inquiry, and discovery. While RS traces its roots to the 1940s, global economic and research and development competition, the nexus between dual-use technology and military power, a cluster of newly emerging industries, scientific responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, and societal shifts towards digitization, combine to challenge RS in unique ways. With an eye on safeguarding traditional notions of open science, our article refurbishes Canadian RS within the context of emerging challenges and international responses. Detailing the legal, extralegal, illegal, and other ways in which RS is threatened, we use a comparative assessment of emerging responses in the US, Australia, Japan, and Israel to draw lessons for Canada.

Relations between higher- and lower-order alcohol and cannabis expectancies and simultaneous use frequency among undergraduate dual users

Background: Simultaneous alcohol and cannabis (i.e. marijuana;[SAM]) use is prevalent among college students. There is limited research on expectancy effects for SAM use, which are known correlates of use frequency and mediators of treatment outcomes. We examined the unique associations of both positive and negative alcohol and cannabis expectancies with frequency of SAM use among college students. Method: Participants were 1012 college students (70.9% female, 51.8% white, M age = 19.63) from seven US universities who reported past-month alcohol and cannabis use (77.2% of the sample reported SAM use). Students completed measures of past-month typical weekly alcohol and cannabis frequency and quantity, alcohol and cannabis expectancies, and SAM frequency through an online self-reported survey. Results: A negative binomial regression revealed that higher-order positive, but not negative, alcohol and cannabis expectancies were significant predictors of SAM frequency above and beyond frequency of alcohol and cannabis use, biological sex, and whether the survey was completed pre- or post-COVID-19 campus closures. Specifically, higher frequency SAM use was associated with weaker positive alcohol and stronger positive cannabis expectancies. A second negative binomial regression including lower-order expectancies found that SAM frequency was associated with weaker social and cognitive and behavioral impairment alcohol expectancies and stronger sexual and social facilitation cannabis and liquid courage alcohol expectancies, specifically. Conclusions: Results highlight the importance of comprehensively examining both higher- and lower-order alcohol and cannabis expectancies when examining SAM frequency, and provide avenues of targeted intervention to reduce SAM use among dual users. © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

Dual-Use Quickscan: A Web-Based Tool to Assess the Dual-Use Potential of Life Science Research.

Research on pathogenic organisms is crucial for medical, biological and agricultural developments. However, biological agents as well as associated knowledge and techniques, can also be misused, for example for the development of biological weapons. Potential malicious use of well-intended research, referred to as "dual-use research", poses a threat to public health and the environment. There are various international resources providing frameworks to assess dual-use potential of the research concerned. However, concrete instructions for researchers on how to perform a dual-use risk assessment is largely lacking. The international need for practical dual-use monitoring and risk assessment instructions, in addition to the need to raise awareness among scientists about potential dual-use aspects of their research has been identified over the last years by the Netherlands Biosecurity Office, through consulting national and international biorisk stakeholders. We identified that Biorisk Management Advisors and researchers need a practical tool to facilitate a dual-use assessment on their specific research. Therefore, the Netherlands Biosecurity Office developed a web-based Dual-Use Quickscan (www.dualusequickscan.com), that can be used periodically by researchers working with microorganisms to assess potential dual-use risks of their research by answering a set of fifteen yes/no questions. The questions for the tool were extracted from existing international open resources, and categorized into three themes: characteristics of the biological agent, knowledge and technology about the biological agent, and consequences of misuse. The results of the Quickscan provide the researcher with an indication of the dual-use potential of the research and can be used as a basis for further discussions with a Biorisk Management Advisor. The Dual-Use Quickscan can be embedded in a broader system of biosafety and biosecurity that includes dual-use monitoring and awareness within organizations. Increased international attention to examine pathogens with pandemic potential has been enhanced by the current COVID-19 pandemic, hence monitoring of dual-use potential urgently needs to be encouraged.

Rapid Proliferation of Pandemic Research: Implications for Dual-Use Risks.

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the world's vulnerability to biological catastrophe and elicited unprecedented scientific efforts. Some of this work and its derivatives, however, present dual-use risks (i.e., potential harm from misapplication of beneficial research) that have largely gone unaddressed. For instance, gain-of-function studies and reverse genetics protocols may facilitate the engineering of concerning SARS-CoV-2 variants and other pathogens. The risk of accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens may be increased by large-scale collection and characterization of zoonotic viruses undertaken in an effort to understand what enables animal-to-human transmission. These concerns are exacerbated by the rise of preprint publishing that circumvents a late-stage opportunity for dual-use oversight. To prevent the next global health emergency, we must avoid inadvertently increasing the threat of future biological events. This requires a nuanced and proactive approach to dual-use evaluation throughout the research life cycle, including the conception, funding, conduct, and dissemination of research.

Biosecurity risks associated with vaccine platform technologies.

Vaccine platforms have been critical for accelerating the timeline of COVID-19 vaccine development. Faster vaccine timelines demand further development of these technologies. Currently investigated platform approaches include virally vectored and RNA-based vaccines, as well as DNA vaccines and recombinant protein expression system platforms, each featuring different advantages and challenges. Viral vector-based and DNA vaccines in particular have received a large share of research funding to date. Platform vaccine technologies may feature dual-use potential through informing or enabling pathogen engineering, which may raise the risk for the occurrence of deliberate, anthropogenic biological events. Research on virally vectored vaccines exhibits relatively high dual-use potential for two reasons. First, development of virally vectored vaccines may generate insights of particular dual-use concern such as techniques for circumventing pre-existing anti-vector immunity. Second, while the amount of work on viral vectors for gene therapy exceeds that for vaccine research, work on virally vectored vaccines may increase the number of individuals capable of engineering viruses of particular concern, such as ones closely related to smallpox. Other platform vaccine approaches, such as RNA vaccines, feature relatively little dual-use potential. The biosecurity risk associated with platform advancement may be minimised by focusing preferentially on circumventing anti-vector immunity with non-genetic rather than genetic modifications, using vectors that are not based on viruses pathogenic to humans, or preferential investment into promising RNA-based vaccine approaches. To reduce the risk of anthropogenic pandemics, structures for the governance of biotechnology and life science research with dual-use potential need to be reworked. Scientists outside of the pathogen research community, for instance those who work on viral vectors or oncolytic viruses, need to become more aware of the dual-use risks associated with their research. Both public and private research-funding bodies need to prioritise the evaluation and reduction of biosecurity risks.

COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2, and Export Controls.

Export controls are intended to prevent the proliferation of materials that could be misused to make biological weapons. They are not intended to stifle critical research and development in the midst of a pandemic. This article explores how and why export controls might apply to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019. It outlines the taxonomic and genetic factors associated with the current approach to export control lists and discusses how they lead to unnecessary ambiguity. The authors describe ways in which the current export control systems might be revised in the short, medium, and long term, including sequence, disease, and function-based approaches.

Prudently conduct the engineering and synthesis of the SARS-CoV-2 virus.

In response to the outbreak of COVID-19 that has been sweeping the world, scientists reconstructed the SARS-CoV-2 rapidly using a synthetic genomics platform, in order to accelerate therapeutics and vaccine development. However, given the dual-use nature of this technology, there exists a high biosecurity risk. This paper points out the potential risks of the engineering SARS-CoV-2 virus and puts forward 6 questions to this work. The authors emphasize that the two basic values of safety/security and intellectual freedom of research must be considered evenly. From the perspective of responsible development of biotechnology, this paper calls for a careful assessment to the risks of the technology, replacing risky technologies with safe ones. The risks of publication also need to be strictly assessed. The authors believe, in addition to enhancing the "self-government" and self-discipline of scientists and scientific communities, government supervision must be reinforced, laws and regulations should be improved, and global regulation framework ought to be constructed.